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Abstract 
 
The paper explores the balance between normative and foreign policy goals in European Union’s 
(EU) peacebuilding policy. It shows that despite the swings between liberal and conservative 
approaches, the EU has focused on building military-capable states and not so much the good 
governed states it purports. This practice has the potential to undermine both EU’s security, political 
and normative goals raising several paradoxes. These include the jeopardising of the good governance 
agenda, losing some control and autonomy over security provision, and the redefinition of security in 
military terms, away from the human security agenda. The article is focused on recent developments 
in the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), some aspects of the CSDP missions, the 
African Peace Facility and the new initiative to grant military support to third parties, the Capacity 
Building for support in Security and Development (CBSD). It shows that though peacebuilding has 
raised much controversy in how it is carried out and financed, the article argues that more than 
contestation, there is much consensus over peacebuilding and order and security goals through it. The 
swings, controversies and paradoxes rather demonstrate a lack of a coherent strategic framework 
where normative and foreign policy goals could be achieved.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Peacebuilding has both a normative and a security dimension that is linked to foreign 
policy interests. These may not need to be in contradiction, in fact they are both part of 
the discursive and material practices that allow states to project power and norms (Brown, 
2002; Chandler, 2010; Dillon & Reid, 2009; Richmond, 2011). This is the case of 
European member states through the European Union (EU). The European Union (EU) 
does not have a peacebuilding policy as such. What it has is a series of instruments that 
allow it to cover a broad set of activities from military intervention to conflict mediation 
and prevention and reconstruction after conflict. 1  Added to this lack of specific 
                                                
* This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and 
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1 The article will still refer to peacebuilding policy to refer to that body of instruments and 
practices that make up EU’s peacebuilding policy.  
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framework is the fact that the principles these instruments should abide by keep swinging. 
From more conservative in ambition and ideals, having security and stability as their main 
aim, to the more liberal and militant, having good governance, democracy and peace as its 
goals, EU’s peacebuilding activities have yet to find a coherent approach.  
 
The two instruments the EU has had so far to fund peacebuilding activities, aside for its 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, are representative. The 
Instrument for Stability (IfS) came in 2007 leaving out any references to ‘peace’, signalling 
security as a priority. Its 2014 revision has been renamed as the Instrument contributing 
to Stability and Peace (IcSP), signalling an attempt to merge the two approaches. 
Currently there is a debate about the possibility to grant military support to third 
countries, which is meant to breach the gaps between development and peacebuilding-
security work under an initiative called Capacity Building in support of Security and 
Development (CBSD). Though it is very disputed, it will likely see the light in the next 
few months.  
 
Thus, embedded in peacebuilding practices there seem to be two contradictory goals: the 
overarching goal of fostering good governed states, promoting democracy, development 
and state reform; and the in-practice ‘second best’ goal of promoting military-capable 
states that are able to take care of their own security. In the interviews undertaken for this 
research and analysing how the security-development nexus is understood by policy-
makers, these two goals are not seen as contradictory but in fact as reinforcing each other. 
In fact, the two have been merged in the concept of resilience. The EU Global Strategy 
(2016) has embraced resilience and what it calls ‘principled pragmatism’ as core foreign 
policy strategies, aiming at bridging the liberal and stabilisation goals. Resilience is 
defined as the ‘the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and 
recovering from internal and external crises’ (EU Global Strategy, p. 23). The aim is to 
‘increase the impact of EU external action and sustain progress towards EU development, 
humanitarian, foreign and security policy objectives’ (EU Commission 2017, p. 2). But 
though this new rhetorical device might have tried to match theory and practice, the fact 
that working on resilience means fostering the military apparatus of the state not only 
highlights the contradictions between the normative and ‘pragmatic’ approaches, it also 
raises a number of paradoxes that question the capacity to fulfil normative and foreign 
policy goals. These paradoxes include the undermining of the good governance agenda by 
propping up military regimes and human rights abuses; the redefinition of security in 
military terms, away from the human-centred agenda; and the losing of control and 
autonomy by becoming a security consumer.  
 
Still, neither the swings in peacebuilding instruments, the controversy around CBSD or 
the lowering of expectations regarding peacebuilding goals can be said to involve that 
much contestation among member states. The parliament has been a different issue. In 
the Commission and the Council, CBSD’s issues ultimately relate to technical finance-
related issues and not principle-related ones. In the Parliament, principled voices have 
raised in regards to the risk of militarising development and peace-related aid, to the 
maintenance of the IcSP as a civilian instrument, and to the EU´s sifting foreign policy 
goals through such instruments. Yet, the practice so far has already been the prioritisation 
of strengthening third states’ own capacity to keep their peace, militarily, and the use of 
IcSP for security goals. Hence CBSD comes to reinforce what is otherwise a consensual 
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goal. One clear example is the intervention in the DRC, where the EU went from massive 
disbursements of aid towards democracy promotion, and a large programme on security 
sector reform, to one where having an organised army and maintaining the main threats 
in check would have meant significant success. This is because, though not the primary 
goal, achieving such level of ‘security’ is not seen in contradiction with the good 
governance goal. This consensus comes from the fact that peacebuilding policy has always 
been about containment of perceived threats, including conflict, refugees and disease 
(Duffield, 2001). The difference is the rhetoric and the fact that containment has become 
even more pressing in light of a rise in refugee numbers, the Brexits, near Grexits, and the 
rise of extreme right-wing parties.  
 
Yet what is more perplexing is that while in some respects the fostering of military-capable 
states has been a consistent goal, perhaps showing that EU´s ethos is ultimately about 
order-preservation and not about the projection of normative values, the research shows 
that even in addressing security issues that are high on the security agenda of member 
states such as terrorism and migration, the budgetary commitments are far from sufficient 
to address such issues. Beyond the contestation and paradoxes, peacebuilding practices 
therefore display incoherences that relate to what David Chandler calls the anti-foreign 
policy. This means ‘the loss of a policy-making framework that previously provided a 
strategic framing’ and rather than signalling the launching of ‘far-reaching interventionist 
instruments, [it] seeks to stress the limits of what can be achieved by external policy-
making’ (2007, p. 364). This was already signalled by Stefano Guzzini (2013) for whom 
Europe’s return to realpolitik with the end of the Cold War was the response European 
foreign policy makers gave to their disorientation to find their place in world politics. The 
‘principled pragmatism’ does not solve ‘existing tensions in its foreign policy’ (Juncos, 
2017, p. 2). The fostering of military-capable states may well be following a wider trend in 
what scholars have termed a militarisation of peacebuilding (Bush 2004; Cunliffe 2016; 
Iñiguez de Heredia 2017; Sloan 2011), but it demonstrates that the EU and its members 
are struggling to match rhetoric and practice, interests and budget and as a result, strategy 
and commitment. In order to explore these issues, the article first provides necessary 
context to understand EU’s peacebuilding policy, then it focuses on the range of existing 
peacebuilding mechanisms and instruments (CSDP missions, IcSP and APF), it then 
analyses the debates around CBSD and concludes with an analysis of the paradoxes the 
promotion of military-capable state raises.2 
 
 
2. EU’s Peacebuiding: a consistent and consensual order-maintenance policy   
 
Peacebuilding has primarily been a process aiming towards granting states the monopoly 
of the means of violence (Chandler, 2009; Hameiri, 2014). For the EU too, and through 
much consensus, peacebuilding in practice has reflected a default minimum foreign 
policy goal: order maintenance and security. In principle, and born as part of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), peacebuilding has come hand in hand with 
normative goals. An early landmark declaration after a UK-France summit already stated 
                                                
2 The article is based on archival research from EU policy documents and 20 interviews with EU 
officials, representatives of member states and stakeholders. 15 were undertaken in Brussels 
and 5 on Skype over the course of the last 6 months.  
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that:  
 
the potential scope of ESDP should match the world-wide ambition of the 
European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and should be able to 
support effectively the EU’s wider external policy objectives to promote democracy, 
human rights, good governance and reform (FCO 2003). 
 
Dr Gerrard Quille, from the Policy Department at the European Parliament in 2006, 
states that another Franco-British Summit in November 2004 confirmed that the 
experience of Operation Artemis in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – the first 
autonomous EU-led military operation launched in June 2003 at the request of the UN 
Security Council – would be the benchmark for developing the Battlegroups for EU 
missions (FCO 2003, p. 4). This related to the goal of statebuilding but also of 
democratisation, development and promoting the rule of law. However, EU’s activities in 
the DRC show that the rush to establish a government overshadowed the possibility of 
more inclusive and participatory forms of governance. Rather, democracy was reduced to 
the organisation of elections, and elections to the legimisation of a leader that has 
compromised both democracy and peace. Theory and practice have gone in different 
directions and security-related goals have prevailed.
 
 
Drafted in the early 1990s, at the backdrop of the breakup of Yugoslavia, EU’s CFSP, and 
its peacebuilding/peacekeeping goals were influenced by the rise of what we could be 
called a militant liberal agenda. That is, not only were foreign and security goals defined 
by the promotion of liberal values and liberal forms of governance overseas, but also by a 
commitment to intervene and deploy troops if necessary for the attainment of such goals 
(EEAS 2016; Richmond, Björkdahl, & Kappler, 2011). Yet if anything, what the crisis in 
the Balkans highlighted was EU’s weakness in terms of not having an agreement about 
how to operationalise CFSP. Bosnians heavily contested EU’s goals and effectiveness 
(Kappler & Richmond, 2011; Keranen, 2013).  
 
The developments that we have seen ever since have gone in this direction, deepening the 
notion of security as defence and prioritising stable states, while reaffirming its liberal 
ethos, though not really working for it. These developments included the consolidation 
of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1999, the Gothenburg 
programme in 2001, which encapsulated the EU Programme for the Prevention of 
Violent Conflicts, and the deployment of the first EU military mission outside Europe, in 
the DRC in 2003, which brought things to practice. The crafting of the CSDP policy was 
very much in line with the spirit of early post-Cold War principles being based on 
multilateralism, the need to intervene abroad, threats defined as external and on 
prevention. It proclaimed that 'the first line of defence will often be abroad', that EU 
'should be able to act before countries around [it] deteriorate' and that 'no single country 
is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.' (EEAS 2016). The strategy was an 
agreement on a multilateral active strategy to tackle threats off site to prevent them 
damaging EU interests or threatening its territory in any direct or indirect way.  Yet, 
despite the focus on prevention, as one EEAS officer pointed out, is still a ‘pending 
subject’ (EEAS officer 12, 2017). The early 2000s are a clear example of how the liberal 
agenda of peacebuilding is itself a security agenda and tending towards ‘status-quo 
approaches’ (Natorski, 2011). While intervening in statebuilding, democratisation and 
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peacekeeping in the DRC and consolidating as an international peacebuilder, with the 
rise of the War on Terror and a heightened global security agenda, the EU also starts to 
define security in defensive terms, and peacebuilding as a process to stabilise states.  
 
In Javier Solana’s European Security Strategy (ESS 2003), prevention, not peacebuilding, 
which is not even named, take centre stage, while linking state failure to a series of key 
identified threats, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts and organised crime. In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon extends the scope 
and range of the St. Petersburg Tasks in conflict prevention and peace-keeping, framing 
peacebuilding in terms of both the normative and the security foreign policy goals, yet it 
is the latter that take again the upper hand in the operationalisation of the first 
peacebuilding-like instrument. The Instrument for Stability (2007) was streamlined to 
better contribute to the EU comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and peace-
building, crisis response and security threats. The dropping of the term ‘ peace’ clearly 
indicated the embracing of a conservative approach against any transformative activities 
with liberal values at the front. Natorski already shows that despite small differences there 
was much consensus around this instrument, which appears to be ‘the result of evolving 
policy practices and not of a preconceived general policy’ (2011, p. 30). This trend 
continues on to the new IcSP, though, at least in its title, ‘peace’ comes back in.   
 
IcSP’s goals are matched with those of the EU’s security strategy, including: a) to swiftly 
contribute to stability in situation of crisis or emerging crisis; b) to contribute to the 
prevention of conflicts and build peace; and c) to address global and trans-regional threats 
to peace, international security and stability (EU Parliament 2014, Art. 1, Para.4a-c). 
However, the instrument has not generated a significant amount of budgetary 
disbursements, and the Turkey-EU deal on migration funded through it, also highlights 
how it can be instrumentalised to fulfill security-related goals. The IcSP comes at a time 
when security as defence, security as the basis for development and the internal threats 
the EU has identified make any cooperation activity and budget subject to such security 
objectives. Notwithstanding the challenges that the EU is facing both ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’, this implicit ‘security first’ approach seems to be a more general trend world-
wide that is exposing the incoherences of the liberal peace agenda (Campbell, Chandler, 
& Sabaratnam, 2011).  
 
The recent EU Global Strategy displays a much less ambitious agenda that places EU’s 
security goals at its heart rather than the promotion of liberal values overseas. It states 
that the EU must contribute to: ‘Responding to external conflicts/crises; Building the 
capacity of partners; Protecting EU citizens’ (EU Global Strategy 2016, p. 9). 
Peacebuilding as a response to crises and prevention work as building the capacity of 
partners highlight the rhetorical shift from the aim to promote good governed states to 
‘resilient’, military-capable ones (EU Commission 2017; Bourbeau 2017). We will see this 
more clearly in the next section.  
 
All these developments manifest consensus over seeing security and defence together. 
Though security might be in principle defined under a human security framework, it is 
the defensive aspect of security that is seen as bringing the possibility of other normative 
goals. In practice and from very early on in developing EU’s CSDP and peacebuildling 
policies, the result has been that the outcome of military capable states has preceded and 
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at times considered good enough, overshadowing the promotion of good governed states. 
And yet, though this may signal a coherent line of action, even if a conservative one, the 
reticence to act and the swings in policy signal substantive incoherence. This is not the 
result of contestation but of a lack of a broader strategy, and the withdrawal to ‘default’ or 
‘minimal-goals’ positions relating to order-maintenance.  
 
 
3. Practices of security through peacebuilding instruments 
 
The furthering of security goals through peacebuilding has been highly debated alongside 
the critique to the liberal peace (Bendaña, 2005; Duffield, 2007; Keen, 2006; Verhoeven, 
2009). Without needing to rehash those debates, it is worth noting that these goals were 
not just seen in purely material ways. Symbolic understandings of self and other, 
identities and meaning construction are part of the relations fostered through 
peacebuilding processes. In this sense, the fact that peacebuilding have been premised on 
images of idealised Western white states to solve the issues of non-Western non-white 
states imply that the pursuit of such goals reinforce and shape power in world politics. It 
is not a coincidence that Africa has been the continent most targeted through the 
different peacebuilding instruments and more specifically through CSDP missions.3 For 
policy-makers, Africa is the most targeted continent for obvious reasons – it is the 
continent with more crises at Europe’s doorstep. However this is inseparable from the 
construction of identities, which are underpinned by hierarchies, racism and 
subjectifications (Sabaratnam, 2017; Wai 2017). In this sense, promoting military-capable 
states in Africa, or anywhere in the Global South, should not be seen as a natural 
consequence of the complex contexts of African countries and the difficulties of working 
there, but the result of long-term patterns of power relations, especially through different 
forms of intervention. The EU in this sense, though here we should do a disaggregation 
of the different member states that have led different missions and programmes, is 
contributing to reproduce such patterns (Charbonneau, 2006).  
 
Several practices and instruments in recent EU-Africa relations give evidence of that. 
Firstly, CSDP missions have primarily targeted Africa, prioritising the strengthening of 
the governing and security apparatus of the state. Secondly, the African Peace Facility 
(APF) is an instrument created to support the military capacities of the African Union. 
Thirdly is the funding of projects that have to do with EU security interests through the 
IcSP. It is not possible to go through all of these in detail. The aim is to show how all 
peacebuilding instruments end up are increasingly focusing on the security of states and 
increasingly from a military perspective.  
 
The CSDP 2016 report details that taking the military and civilian levels together, they 
have trained over 10,000 people. Such training is based on activities that relate to 
reinforcing the security apparatus of the state in the skills the army and the police have. 
They include public order policing, applying laws on irregular migration, integrated 
border management, maritime security, and interview techniques – on the police side 
(CSDP 2016, p. 4). They also include ‘mortar firing, infantry skills, force organisation, 
                                                
3 Since the inception of EU’s peacebuilding operations in 2003, the EU has deployed 22 civilian 
and 10 military operations (EEAS 2017).  
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sniper skills, engineering, logistics, tactical air control party, and intelligence gathering’ 
(CSDP 2016, p.5). All this training has embedded a dimension of human rights training 
as well as gender, corruption and good practices at the level of management and 
recruitment. From the documents and interviews conducted, it is clear that good 
governance goals ‘go hand in hand’ or ‘cannot be seen as detached’ (French and German 
delegates 2017). But as EU Peace and Security Adviser (2017) stated, ‘the rule of law is 
not enough, we need to work on security to support that.’  
 
The other dimension is the propping of the central government and military apparatus of 
the state. In the DRC for instance, the EU, both under the UN but also autonomously, 
such as in the case of the Artemis operation, has prioritised the granting of the monopoly 
of the use of violence to the state, even if that has meant the propping up of an 
increasingly authoritarian regime, such as Kabila’s. This is despite the fact that two of the 
most visible programmes, SSR and democratisation, which have drawn a significant 
amount of resources, are, theoretically, directly related to good governance goals. 
However, though for instance in regards to democratisation, the EU at one point funded 
80% of the US$600 billion that elections in 2006 cost, in practice, EU’s policies have 
followed policies that have reinforced many of the problems the DRC had in terms of 
poor security management, new sources of violence and deepened the legitimacy gap 
between the state and society (de Vries, 2016; Kets & de Vries, 2014; Vlassenroot & 
Timothy Raeymaekers, 2009). The EU has been decreasing its commitment in the DRC, 
even in the early phase of high budgetary commitment to the DRC, the focus on 
government-formation and state-stabilisation, over other normative goals was already 
visible. The transitional government formula of 1+4 placed Joseph Kabila as president, 
supported by four vice-presidents, each representing one of the warring parties, some of 
which were not only responsible for having plundered the areas of the country where 
their armies set foot in, they were also accused of crimes against humanity. As Ahamed 
notes, the UN and EU’s strategy of peace from very early on was one of sustaining 
warlords (2006: 288). Under the broad rubric of 'opposition' the agreement also largely 
excluded the Mai Mai militias who had been crucial for maintaining certain areas of 
Eastern DRC under government control, and traditional opposition parties like the 
Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS). All these issues have later backfired 
and are felt in the continuation of the conflict in Eastern DRC today (Verweijen & 
Iguma Wakenge, 2015). I am not saying that the EU is responsible for the democratic 
deficit in the DRC, but that despite EU’s good governance goals, in the DRC, it has been 
the formation of government with the military actors that has prevail, and the attempt to 
build a state that is able to maintain its own security within its borders. The conflict today 
is still open, and it has only been the pressure from pro-democracy activists that has 
pushed international donors like the EU and the US to press on Kabila to step down, 
after he was delaying the holding of elections where he cannot run anymore (The 
Guardian, 2015). EU’s second best choice was neither a stable nor an effective strategy.  
 
This also relates to the militaristic approach to issues such as piracy, migration and 
terrorism in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and Libya. These operations are not only 
concerned with the actual issues, to which the use of military intervention is at least 
controversial, but also with the fact that they are portrayed as complementary to state 
authority in the absence of a recognised authority with the necessary capacity to deal with 
these issues. The problem is that, despite these interventions, these issues are on the rise 
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(Gibbons-Neff 2017; AFED 2016). For EU Military Staff member (2017) it was clear that 
the goal with CSDP missions and the new CBSD strategy is to ‘guarantee that states are 
capable of assuring a military security’ though he also said, such goal ‘raises 
contradictions’ in terms of coordination and actual budget. 
 
The APF is an instrument created in 2003 in the spirit of multilateralism as an EU-AU 
agreement for the purpose of boosting the military capacity of the AU in terms of conflict 
prevention. In that sense it has been the forerunner of the goals the EU aspires to in its 
peacebuilding and security policy now. It is now the main tool for implementing the 
Africa-EU Peace and Security Cooperation. In fact, supporting the AU to deal with 
African countries’ conflicts has received ample consensus from within the EU: 
 
There was and continues to be a large consensus around the instrument. Imagine if 
you have to do Operations Cerval or Artemis very often, the idea is that the African 
Union manages that themselves [sic]. As far as I know one was opposed to its 
creation, even if that meant to create an instrument outsdie the treaty. I have never 
heard any member state to say, we need to get rid of the APF. There are discussions 
around the budget, for instance around AMISOM, asking to reduce the number of 
soldiers to give more money towards building capabilities, that yes, but the nature 
of APF, no. (EEAS official 4, 2017)    
 
Asked about whether the security objectives were being placed on top of normative and 
development goals, the officer told me two things. On the record he said the following: 
 
If you go to the documents such as the European consensus on development and in 
general, the EU’s vision is that one thing is linked to the other – the security 
development nexus. They are interlinked. The aim of the APF is to support the 
security architecture that African countries have created themselves and manage the 
peace issues that Africans have. That has three parts: all what has to do with conflict 
prevention and mediation; capacity-building around the african security 
architecture so that all that becomes operationalized; and then another part more 
linked to military operations -  though not all peace operations are military.  
 
Then off the record he remarked: 
 
You are right, there is a strong push towards security issues, carried by migration. 
What the EU wants is that African states do what the EU needs. The EU has 
certain security objectives that want to fulfil but without getting its hands dirty, 
making the minimum effort. You can see it in Mali, you’re not going to finish with 
AQMI putting €50m per year. Also, the EU does not trust the AU. For certain 
aspects they cannot be trusted because they take ages, they are slow and they do not 
have the capacity to fulfil EU objectives. All the ideas about panafricanism and 
support to the AU, that has been relegated to security objectives, we will see what is 
to come in the next few years as the APF was always temporary and came in a spirit 
of multilateralism.  
 
The APF has been the forerunner of what the IcSP aims to do now with the CBSD 
initiative. The words of this interviewee were echoed in another conversation with an 
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IcSP related official, who admitted to have noted a ‘securitisation’ of the instrument. 
 
I can see a tendency to securitise the instrument. We are pushed on that a lot. It 
has started with the training equipment, after 3-4 years we are increasingly pushed 
to work hand by hand with the CSDP missions, mostly civilian, but also military, 
and to see that the IcSP can be complementary to the CSDP missions. We have 
done that in Mali, Niger, Somalia, and in a certain way in the DRC with the RSS 
activities complementary to EUSEC. There is a tendency to push the IcSP because 
there are no other financial instruments with which to do that sort of actions. 
There is the APF, which has its advantages but also its inconveniences, most starkly, 
the AU – it is fairly rigid. We [the IcSP] are independent, it is up to us to make 
decisions, and we can mobilise fairly quickly the necessary funds to support security 
forces. Really, for the quick actions it us that can do those actions.’ (EEAS Officer 
7, 2017)   
 
In fact, going through the activities the IcSP funded projects, there are many that have 
migration and counter-terrorism embedded in them.  
 
Table 1. Number of IcSP-funded projects4 
 
Type of projects Total 
Confidence building, mediation and dialogue 63 
Assistance to migrants and host populations 28 
Economic recovery/livelihoods 21 
Security sector reform 20 
Culture, media and conflict 14 
Humanitarian mine action; small arms and light weapons 14 
Women, peace and security and gender mainstreaming 14 
Natural resources and conflict 13 
Children, youth and conflict 12 
Reconstruction and rehabilitation 11 
Early warning and mainstreaming conflict sensitivity 10 
Countering violent extremism/counter terrorism 8 
Miscelaneous 8 
Electoral assistance 7 
Transitional justice 7 
Mainstreaming human rights 6 
Natural disaster preparedness and response 6 
Rule of law / legal and judicial development 6 
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 2 
Mainstreaming human rights, 2 
 
The table shows that the greatest number of projects is related to mediation but as EEAS 
officers stated, the number of mediation and confidence building is higher because it is 
the cheapest (EEAS Officer 7; EEAS Officer 12). But if we do a table with the ten most 
                                                
4 Data gathered from IcSP 2017 projects website.  
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financed projects we get another picture. 
 
Table 2. 10 most funded projects through the IcSP5 
 
Name of project Amount Duration Location Type of 
project 
SIRI - Support to the 
stabilisation and immediate 
relief of communities at risk 
in CAR 
 
10,000,000.00  
12/08/15-
11/02/17 
Central 
African 
Republic 
Assistance to 
migrants and 
host 
populations 
Support to Returnees and 
their Communities in the 
Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA). 
 
10,000,000.00  
19/09/16-
18/03/18 
Pakistan Assistance to 
migrants and 
host 
populations 
Restoration of Local 
Governance and 
Reconciliation in Crisis-
Affected Areas of Ukraine 
 
10,000,000.00  
28/05/16-
27/11/17 
Ukraine  
Short Term Low Volume 
Sea Water Desalination 
Plant for Southern 
Governorates of the Gaza 
Strip 
 
10,000,000.00  
19/09/12-
18/12/17 
Palestine Reconstruction 
and 
rehabilitation 
Support to Early Recovery 
and Socio-Economic 
Stability of the drought 
affected population in 
Ethiopia 
 
11,000,000.00  
15/01/16-
14/07/17 
Ethiopia Natural 
disaster 
preparedness 
and response 
Addressing the Security 
Needs of Syrian Refugees 
Residing in Camps in 
Jordan 
 
12,000,000.00  
1/07/13-
30/10/15 
Jordan Assistance to 
migrants and 
host 
populations 
Improve the Stability of 
Northern Lebanon through 
the Reconstruction of Nahr 
el-Bared Camp 
 
12,000,000.00  
1/08/13-
31/01/16 
Lebanon Reconstruction 
and 
rehabilitation 
Strengthening social 
cohesion for a democratic 
and inclusive Syrian civil 
society 
 
14,999,271.00  
12/08/15-
11/04/18 
Syria Culture, media 
and conflict 
Conflict Reduction through 
Improving Health Care 
Services for the Vulnerable 
Population in Lebanon 
 
20,000,000.00  
15/01/14-
14/07/15 
Lebanon Assistance to 
migrants and 
host 
populations 
                                                
5 Data gathered from IcSP 2017 projects website.  
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Strengthening the 
operational capacities of the 
Turkish Coast Guard in 
managing migration flows 
in the Mediterranean Sea 
 
20,000,000.00  
22/08/16-
21/02/18 
Turkey Security sector 
reform 
 
The 10 most funded projects relate to those which support states dealing with the influx 
of migrants and maintaining migrants in good conditions so that they stay there and do 
not come to the EU. Other projects also relate to activities that through the prevention of 
disasters would also prevent an elevated number of migrants coming into the EU.  
 
According to an EEAS official (no. 13, 2017), the same trend is found in other 
instruments that are suffering what could be termed, a securitisation. Referring to the 
Trust Fund, this EEAS officer noted that it ‘was created to “address de root causes of 
migration”’. The idea was to create a fund to speed up the implementation of 
development funds, but some of it is being used to support border police and other 
related actors to deal with migration mostly in Niger, but also incountries of origin and 
transit such as Mali, Níger, Etiopía and Guinea’ (EEAS Officer 13, 2017). 
  
What this demonstrates is that despite the swings and diverging approaches of different 
member states at particular times, there is consensus around the fact that the EU depends 
on the capacity of its neighbours to be able to deal with its own security. In this context, 
as shown in the next section, it is not surprising that new initiatives are coming to 
support and deepen the security goals, which relate to the strengthening of states’ own 
security, and importantly, military security capabilities.  
 
 
4. Granting military support: The new CBSD initiative 
 
CBSD is a proposed regulation that would allow supporting ‘capacity-building 
programmes in third countries aimed at training and mentoring, the provision of non-
lethal equipment and assistance with infrastructure improvements, and help with 
strengthening the capacity of military actors’ (EPRS 2017, p. 1).  It has raised much 
controversy because such support is not allowed by the Treaty of the EU and can 
potentially take away development money towards more strictly security-related 
cooperation. The treaty of the EU excludes any such support through either CFSP 
measures or under development cooperation that wants to abide by OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria. In a comprehensive briefing of the 
EU Parliament it is noted that ‘[a]rticle 41(2) TEU rules out the possibility of using the 
EU budget for “expenditure arising from operations having military or defence 
implications”’ (EPRS 2017, p. 8). Moreover, it also recalls that ‘[t]he fact that this 
exception is included in the EU’s primary law led the European Commission’s Legal 
Service to argue with regard to the joint communication on CBSD that the modification 
of existing EU external action instruments or the adoption of new ones, as a matter of 
secondary law, could not provide for such financing’ (EPRS 2017, p. 8).6  
                                                
6 See contacts for more information.  
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Still, the proposal is now ready to be debated in the Parliament (14/09/2017). It came 
from an initial proposal by the Commission, which pointed out the general deterioration 
of the security environment in Europe’s neighbourhood, especially in Africa (EU 
Commission 2015, p. 1). Then firmly grounded in the mantra of the security-
development nexus, it states that ‘[f]or any country to ensure its security and 
development, it must have or acquire adequate capacities in all critical sectors, including 
security and defence’ (EU Commission 2015, p. 3). It identifies a series of activities and 
instruments that already allow the EU to do such capacity-building, for instance through 
CSDP missions and through the APF.  
 
In 2016, the Commission submitted a formal proposal to the Parliament that reaffirmed 
the spirit of the initial proposal, overall staying that ‘[t]he improvement of the functioning 
of military actors and strengthening of their governance, particularly in fragile contexts 
and countries emerging from conflict, contributes to peace, human security, and stability, 
and thereby to the achievement of the SDGs [Sustainable Development Goals]’ (EU 
Commission 2016, p. 3). After much discussion as to where to locate this initiative within 
current instruments or in an instrument of its own, the Commission finally proposed to 
review the IcSP and grant it €100m over the period of 2017-2020 under Heading IV of 
the general budget of the Union – that is, external action, development and 
humanitarian assistance (EU Commission 2016, p. 5). It says that such assistance would 
take place in exceptional circumstances, to prevent violence, combat terrorism and crime 
and that this could entail training, mentoring, advice, as well as the provision of non-
lethal equipment, infrastructure and provision of services (EU Commission 2016, p.5).  
 
The proposal addresses the risks raised by critics and some suggestions about how to 
mitigate them. The most controversial is the misuse of equipment leading to human 
rights violations and International humanitarian Law as well as the transfer to unfriendly 
actors. The ban on lethal equipment is seen as a ready-made mitigating mechanism. The 
proposal also suggests a risk management methodology, a risk assessment and a 
continuous monitoring during the implementation phase. Other risks include corruption 
in the financial management, in the effective use of the programmes, fraud and 
irregularities. In general, CBSD has created two blocs between proponents and detractors 
that poise the Parliament against the Commission and against part of the Council, the 
Commission against the Council and vice-versa, member states within the Council 
against each other and divides different groups in the Parliament.   
 
Proponents of the initiative argue that the EU needs to enhance cooperation with the 
defence security sector and the military in third countries for its own security (EPRS 
2017; EU Commission 2016a). The 2016 EU’s Global strategy is largely based on this 
idea, even claiming that ‘[t]he idea that Europe is an exclusively “civilian power” does not 
do justice to an evolving reality’; ‘our neighbour’s weaknesses are our weaknesses’ and 
that ‘[i]t is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies 
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to the east stretching into Central Asia, and to the south down to Central Africa’ (EU 
Commission 2016b, p.4 and 9).  
 
In speaking to the representatives of the most vocal member states in this issue, the 
message is clear: there is a need to foster the military capacity of third states in order to 
foster their capacity to deal with crises, which are a potential threat to the EU. These 
threats are rooted in poverty, human rights abuses, lack of opportunities for the young 
and in some places, armed conflict. Hence, this initiative is a win-win situation that 
fosters the link between security and development. For instance, French representative 
stated that the link between security and military support was about the control of the 
territory. ‘When there is no control of the territory, there is no statebuilding, no 
administration building, community building and the international support is wasted. In 
Africa in particular, the military has a different role than in Europe. Very often they tend 
to go to places where the police cannot go. The aim is to support the military to support 
the population when they need it. And we hope CBSD will support that’ (French 
delegate 2017).  
 
The German delegate (2017) made the point with an example: ‘In South Sudan, for 
instance, we did cooperation and state building, putting a lot of money on rebuilding 
state institutions. But none was left because of the conflict - no NGOs, no-one, it was 
even difficult to deliver humanitarian aid. If there is a conflict you cannot have 
development, and then we go back to arms. Security and development reinforce each 
other.’ Other representatives refer to the oft-quoted examples of Mali and Somalia where 
despite the training and investment, little was left because of lack of ongoing support. For 
instance, EU military staff officer (2017) referring to Mali stated: ‘we provide them with 
courses just to keep them at schools - they’re happy to be trained, they’re like dry swans 
seeking water, like children, but then what? they don’t have arms because they are under 
an embargo, no barracks, sometimes no uniforms or boots. Why not use these 
instruments for these purposes?’ 
 
For EU Peace and Security adviser (2017), the issue was a practical one: ‘the fact that 
everything that is not CSDP comes from the Commission has created a dichotomy 
between what is civil security (paid by the Commission) and military security (paid by the 
Council). This makes no sense in the pursuit of our objectives in certain countries, 
especially in some African countries where the military takes up police, or civilian tasks. 
Part of the problem is that the EU did not have expertise in the domain of security, that 
was up to each member state. CBSD will allow to address better the root causes of 
conflict that we have in places like Mali, Sahel, CAR, Camerooon. For instance in 
Cameroon now they need to draw on local militias, does that reinforce the rule of law?’  
 
The core argument is that the work that is being done through CSDP missions needs to 
be better coordinated with that done from other instruments and that ignoring the needs 
of military equipment and training does not fulfil peace, development or security 
objectives.   
 
Detractors put the accent on the fact that they do not want to give military support with 
development money. They also argue that it is a proposal outside treaty, with no 
substantive legal basis. They raise the risks already gathered by the proposal in terms of 
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misuse and corruption. The pilot project in Mali already gave some examples, some of 
them quite comical. As part of the intelligence gathering training support, spying 
equipment was granted to several key offices, including headquarters in Bamako. It was 
here, where the equipment was used by a high-level Malian military officer to spy on his 
wife who was cheating him instead of putting it to the service of anti-terrorist activities 
(EEAS officer 9, 2017).  But other examples highlight the complexities of the cooperation 
and training dynamics. The same officer recounted the ‘dilemma’ faced with the principle 
of ownership:  
 
If the EU has an obligation to apply the principle of ownership, which is embedded 
in the Cotonou agreement for African countries and applies in principle to all 
support, then respecting ownership means renouncing to transparency. Mali 
opposed the EU proposal to support changing the recruitment phase. The EU 
suggested that candidates go through the selection process for free or very cheaply, 
and that checks were implemented to allow the recruitment of a range of ethnic 
groups. Yet Mali wanted to keep the control of that process and by allowing the EU 
reforms, they felt like losing it. In this case, maybe they do just want to recruit 
people from the South, but to me it is an example that if they say ‘no’, the EU has 
to respect that under the principle of ownership. At the end of the day the 
profesionalisation of the security forces will not be attained because the process is 
faulty (EEAS officer 9, 2017). 
 
Along the same lines, an EPLO officer (2017) raised examples coming from similar 
support from the United States to Mali, where some of the equipment and training was 
used against the central government. The officer also recalled Operation Likofi in 2014 in 
the DRC, were EU-trained police engaged in human rights violations in Kinshasa. The 
EPLO wrote a letter to the EU insufficient justification, jeopardise the IcSP and lack of 
legal grounds (EPLO 2017). In general, civil society groups have not welcome the move. 
The misuse, slippery slopes and complexities that capacity-building raises. They see this as 
something to remain the domain of CSDP and the Athena mechanism. This is the case 
even in some quarters of the Commission itself. As an anonymous interviewee stated, 
‘there is dissent off the record, but ‘they feel they can’t push against it because you wont 
[be able to] either. It is a bit like a streamroller’ (Anonymous officer 2017). This was 
noticeable speaking to EEAS officials close to the issue. For instance, an EEAS officer 
stated that ‘it does not make sense to furnish material to troops, we’re not a furnishing 
agency, and less so within the IcSP’ (EEAS officer 7, 2017).  The Turkish-Europe deal was 
resisted from within the EEAS but it finally went ahead: ‘When we were pushed to 
contribute directly to the Turkish facility, which was clearly an EU-Turkey deal on 
common interests, we said no. Finally, they cut out 60m of our budget, it is a lot because 
we have a total budget of €220m. What was proposed, really did not have room within 
the Instrument’s framework’ (FPI officer 1, 2017).  
 
But for the Nordic countries together with Luxemburgh, which have been the most vocal 
opponents to the initiative, the issue is more about the militarisation of development aid 
and the granting of money to activities that are not directed towards poverty alleviation. 
Sweden for instance issued a statement saying that the Commission’s proposals ‘does not 
respect the ODA-criteria’ and raising concerns about the ‘blurring of development 
cooperation and security-related activities’ (EU Council 2017, p. 12). However, this was 
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not against CBSD itself, but just in regards to the risks of ‘undermining the development 
agenda as well as the effectiveness of the CBSD’ (EU Council 2017, p. 13). The statement 
emphasises that ‘Sweden strives for an efficient and fully operational solution to CBSD’ 
(EU Council 2017, p. 13). Member states in general agree to grant military support but 
have differences about where the money comes from and how it is operationalized. 
Where there is principle-opposition is in the European Parliament.  
 
Heidi Hautala (2017), a Finnish MEP, wrote an article arguing that ‘Europe’s 
development policy should stay true to its aims of eradicating poverty and raising people’s 
quality of life. The increasing military slant of EU development aid is both illegal and 
inhumane.’  Though she agrees with the idea underlying the security-development-nexus, 
she does not see ‘that security cooperation equals development cooperation’ (Hautala 
2017). For her if the EU fails to guide development aid by the principles of development 
and poverty alleviation ‘the instrument will become a first step on the way to 
instrumentalising human security for the purposes of military security’ (Hautala 2017).  
 
Other MEPs have raised concerns. For instance, GUE/NGL MEP Lola Sanchez 
Caldentey said ‘[t]his new instrument [the IcSP] is not only a scam for taxpayers but also a 
perverse use of development funds. It functions as a bribe to third countries in exchange 
for externalising EU borders while turning a blind eye to our obligations towards asylum-
seekers’ (GUE/NGL 2017). Similarly, German MEP Sabine Lösing added: ‘[t]he 
European Parliament continues a fatally flawed path towards EU militarisation, moving 
away from the self-proclaimed “union for peace” to one that only has military solutions to 
peace and development’ (GUE/NGL 2017). In the final vote of amendments prior to the 
Parliamentary plenary, a minority opinion was launched stating among other things that 
they oppose the document because it ‘supports the use of development aid for military 
purposes’ and demand ‘a pure civilian use of the [IcSP] and no use of development aid 
for military purposes’ (EU Parliament 2017). 
 
What this shows is a controversy at two different levels confronting all major institutions 
of the EU. On the one hand there is a question about EU-internal politics, and the 
technicalities of how CBSD is done and with which funding. This issue divides member 
states in the Council and it is putting the Commission and the Council against each 
other. On the other hand, there is a more principled issue that is dividing the Parliament 
and is putting some groups in the Parliament against the Commission and the Council. 
However, they highlight Oriol Costa’s argument (2017, p. 2), that ‘[n]orm promotion is 
not a one-sided effort: it is met by opposite endeavors that turn diffusion into 
contestation.’ 
 
From resilience to militarisation?  
 
Seen the above, it could be argued that this new proposal takes a step further from 
‘resilience’ to clearly focus on the military capabilities of the state. Yet, as has been argued 
all along, this is much in line with the practice since the inception of peacebuilding 
activities. The CBSD proposal is clearly one that attempts to relieve states from their 
expenditures while still fulfilling their security and political goals. But with this, as EU 
military staff officer notes (2017) ‘the Council has to decide whether they want to keep 
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putting money, maintaining their decision-making power, or they stop “paying twice” and 
they leave things up to the commission’.  
 
From another point of view, ‘what member states want is to retain the same amount of 
control that they have with CSDP missions under the CBSD initiative. But it is out to be 
different and some members states were disappointed because it was not going as far as 
they wanted, and it was making even the member states that were pushing for it uneasy. 
Of course for the Commission is good news, because it can step on territory, previously 
preserved for member states’ (Anonymous 2017). 
 
The question that remains is whether military support will in fact help peace and 
development, or it is a way to further security interests in an uncompromising manner. 
However, what the record on military support, including lethal equipment, is that it does 
not always work. It is therefor naïve to think that this time, non-lethal military support, 
with the low budgetary commitment the EU wants to make and the conditionalities it has 
on its application, will work in the way the EU Commission and the Council want. It 
therefore raises a number of paradoxes and much incoherence.  
 
 
5. Conclusion: Paradoxes and incoherences in the military-capable state 
 
The above shows that the focus on military-capable states provokes a number of 
paradoxes, some of which jeopardise both political interests and normative values. These 
paradoxes include the undermining of the good governance agenda by propping up 
military regimes and human rights abuses; the redefinition of security in military terms, 
away from the liberal human-centred agenda; and the losing of control and autonomy by 
making the EU a security consumer, transferring the attainment of security goals to the 
target states. Further, these paradoxes imply that more than contestation around 
peacebuilding policy, which, as shown above, displays much consensus, especially among 
member states and their foreign policy, what peacebuilding policy shows is a sort of 
incoherence. It signals the ‘return’ to a default geopolitical position of maintaining order, 
that though might seem coherent, it displays a lack of real strategic thinking (Chandler, 
2007; Guzzini, 2013). To conclude this paper, this final section first analyses the 
paradoxes identified  and reflects on their implications at the end.  
 
a) The undermining of the good governance agenda  
 
Whereas third countries’ security and economic performance cannot be solely attributed 
to the EU, EU’s focus on the ‘second best’ outcome has jeopardised the primary goals. 
Just a quick overview of the outcomes from the CSDP military missions so far show that 
their goal has been to stabilise and reinforce state and government capacities. The case of 
the DRC, explored briefly above, already showed that democracy and the good 
governance agenda were compromised for the goal of statebuilding. Of course, for EU 
officials this is none of their fault since all of the programmes they have enacted in the 
DRC were in the spirit of promoting good governance. The EU, to a large extent, was the 
architect of the first democratic elections after 35 years of Mobutu’s dictatorship and after 
10 years of a bloody conflict. Yet, as already stated, the need to quickly restablish state 
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authority, and in the figure of Kabila in particular, undermined the possibility of building 
a more inclusive and participatory regime.  
 
In the current IcSP instrument, there are already examples that signal similar trade-offs. 
For instance, Niger’s police forces have received basic equipment, training and mentoring 
to develop their capabilities (IcSP 2017). The priority here is to curb migration and allow 
Niger to deal with it in an effective manner. Niger is also an important target of the War 
against Terror. However, NGOs have accused Nigerien police of cracking down on 
dissent in the name of anti-terrorist policy. A prominent case has been that of Moussa 
Tchangari, a journalist and General Secretary of the organisation Alternative Espace 
citoyens. He was detained ‘for criticizing the government’s handling of the fight against 
Boko Haram’ (International Peace Institute 2016). In general ‘[Niger’s] government has 
repeatedly declared a state of emergency, and concerns have grown about security forces’ 
treatment of civilians, especially displaced persons’ (International Peace Institute 2016). 
EU officials believe in the checks and balances embedded in the instrument. Yet civil 
society groups have continued to raise concerns over the empowering of a repressive 
Nigerien police.  
 
The IcSP has also granted Cameroonian police equipment with the aim of supporting 
their fight against Boko Haram. Yet, President Biya is one of the longest serving 
presidents in Africa, with a very poor human rights-track record, particularly of his police 
and army. This clashes with the IcSP programme in Cameroon aiming to foster a ‘climate 
of confidence between the state and its citizens in the far north of Cameroon (2015 - 
2017)’. The fact that again, Cameroon stands as a regime that is far from resembling 
democracy and good governance values contradicts the EU’s attempt to ‘build 
confidence’ between states and citizens.  
 
Another issue altogether is the nature of the good governance agenda and whether the 
fact that the EU goes for a ‘second best’ option is in fact in line with what good 
governance was for in the first place. But though for many scholars this is the natural 
consequence of what the good governance agenda is about – a discursive device to further 
Western interests in the form of control, discipline and even imperialism (Chandler, 
2010; Duffield, 2001; Richmond, 2011), it is also the result of the nature of such 
interventions. These interventions have displayed a lack of commitment to the goals they 
were meant to achieve, even in terms of foreign policy goals, and in terms of the 
backlashes and resistance on the part of the ‘target societies’ (Iñiguez de Heredia, 2017; 
Lemay-Hébert, 2014; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2011; Sabaratnam, 2017). 
Notwithstanding the possible instrumentalisation of good governance, the focus on the 
military-capable state signals a retreat rather than a renewed commitment for further 
engagement.   
 
b) The losing of control and autonomy, the EU a security consumer 
 
In the course of the above discussion it has been shown how the EU in multiple 
documents and statements is conveying a message that partners and neighbours need to 
be able to take care of their own security to be able to securitise itself. With this, however, 
the EU is transferring the attainment of security goals to the target states and as such 
becoming a security consumer, losing control and autonomy over its own security. The 
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question that comes with this is whether the EU has been at any point a security 
provider. EU’s nature as a civilian normative power and to its resulting role as a security 
consumer or as a security provider has been debated for a long time. Esther Barbé and 
Benjamin Kienzley (2007) argue that the EU cannot be seen as the civilian power it used 
to be up to the point it started to grant itself military capabilities. Yet, it can it cannot be 
seen as ‘a classical military or great power either’ (Barbé & Kienzle, 2007, p. 519). But as 
they ask, if the EU is neither a classical nor a pure normative power, then ‘which kind of 
actor is it?’ (Barbé & Kienzle, 2007, p. 520). The response is that the EU swings from a 
security provider to a security consumer depending on the circumstances and the context 
(Barbé & Kienzle, 2007). And though this may still be the case, the above shows that by 
fostering military-capable states, the EU is showing that it is, in principle, a security 
consumer, though in exceptional circumstances it may be willing to become a security 
provider.  
 
As former Spanish delegate noted, this is something that EU member states want to 
change: ‘the EU, by establishing the new military headquarters in Brussels, renegotiating 
its relationship with the US and NATO, aims at becoming more autonomous and stop 
being a security consumer’ (Spanish former delegate 2017). Despite these steps, the 
practice and rhetoric contradict that. Rather the EU seems to have become conscious of 
its reality and now aspires that others fulfil its security goals, especially in places like 
Africa. In fact, what the above also suggests is that beyond the promotion of liberal values 
as a normative power, the EU fosters a climate of security with the role of the military 
arm of the state and its security as paramount for the maintenance of order. This order is 
therefore not a liberal order or a rule of law order, but rather what EU member states see 
as the bare minimum in order to both relate to each other and preserve the world they 
live in. In this sense, the EU demonstrates to be increasingly dependent and lacking 
control.  
 
c) The redefinition of security in military terms 
 
A final implication is the redefinition of security, away from the liberal terms of the 
human security agenda, and more closely related to a traditional understanding of 
security, with military and police capacities at the centre. In some respects this shows 
much coherence with the fact that EU’s security policy has always been attached to 
defence policy. Of course, context and time has influenced how security and defence 
policy has been operationalised, and as stated earlier, this came always hand in hand with 
normative goals. But if the post-Cold War agenda for peacebuilding, security and 
development cooperation entailed the promotion of liberal values as a way to redeploy a 
particular kind of state, the contemporary context throws a more inward-looking 
approach that goes ‘back to basics’ in terms of what the EU is able to achieve overseas. 
There remains however something of the broadened definition of security pushed 
through the liberal agenda, which is the fact that the object to protect is not just ‘states’ as 
the black boxes of traditional neorealist theory, but also businesses and commercial 
interests, people and, more importantly, public opinion and EU’s own reputation among 
European citizens, as well as certain identities European countries want to project (Wrver 
1996; Buzan 1990). Whether this is the way to achieve it, again, is questionable.  
 
In this context, there is not only a securitisation of development cooperation, and a 
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militarisation of peacebuilding activities, but also the losing of a strategic framework. The 
security-development nexus was always prone to place security first, subjecting 
development to security goals and allowing the EU not to become too implicated. The 
incoherence in terms of how goals become compromised added to the lack of 
commitment when it comes to political and budgetary commitment indicate that this lack 
of strategy is a fact in EU quarters. Incoherence and not contestation over strategy, 
process and goals is what most adequately explains what is otherwise a trend in regards to 
peacebuilding. Problems of policy coherence have come up as new forms of intervention, 
mostly in situations of internal conflict, have developed in an ad hoc and unplanned way, 
not directly based upon clear expressions of the political interests and policy needs of 
either national or institutional actors. The swings policy has suffered in terms of their 
actual goals also highlights that beyond the grand statements of purpose (‘the Global War 
on Terror; Make Poverty History’) it is disengagement, passing on responsibilities to 
NGOs and international institutions and lack of strategic thinking that marks this ‘anti-
foreign policy’ approach (Chandler, 2007, p. 363). What is therefore at stake here is not 
just how contestation pushes or erases norms but how the EU deals with its own 
limitations and lack of commitment towards clear normative and foreign policy goals.   
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